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JOHN MNIARSHALL'S SHORT WAY WITH STATUTES
A Study in the Judicial Use of Legislation
to Expound the Constitution
By WALLACE MENDELS0N _
Learned Hand, one of our wisest judges, observed that the
words of a statute are "empty vessels into which (a judge)
can pour nearly anything he will." And Felix Frankfurter has
pointed out that "The (Supreme) Court's ingenuity in using
legislation as an aid either in curbing or expanding constitu-
tional powers is a great unwritten chapter in our constitutional
history "1 That chapter, like so many others, finds a beginning
with Chief Justice Marshall-and nowhere does the cat of Mar-
shall's preconceptiong more freely escape the bag than in the
"esoteric" constructions which he put upon both state and na-
tional legislative measures. As though constantly conscious that
the days of the Federalists upon the bench were limited, he could
not wait upon the facts, but must with "painful ingenuity"
work the material at hand against the evil day when the agrar-
ians would control the judiciary If judges who are ambitious
to mold the law have little choice in the cases and facts pre-
sented for adjudication, Marshall's efforts at least are a monu-
ment to the proposition that in the interpretation of statutes
there is scope for judicial discretion and the vindication of per-
sonal preconceptions.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the
Supreme Court to issue "writs of mandamus, in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States." '2 The act had been drafted by Oliver Ellsworth, Mar-
shall's predecessor on the bench, who had earlier served as a
member of the Constitutional Convention. It had been enacted
by a Congress several of whose members had attended the Con-
stitutional Convention including some of the leading lawyers and
B.A. Ph.D., Wisconsin; LL.B., Harvard. Assoc. Professor of
Political Science, University of Tennessee.
'FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHA4LL, TANEY
AND WAITE (1937) 20.
STATUTES AT LARGE, I, Ch. 20, Sec. 13.
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legal scholars of the day-William Paterson, George Wythe,
Gouverneur Morris, Robert Morris, William Johnson, William
Few, George Read, Richard Bassett, Caleb Strong, James Madi-
son, Abraham Baldwin, Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth.
George Washington, who signed the measure as President, had
been the convention's presiding officer. Apparently all under-
stood and intended that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
merely authorized the Supreme, Court to issue writs of mandamus
to federal officials in cases wherein it properly had jurisdiction.
Certainly "the plain meaning" of the language used will bear
that construction at least as well as any other. To hold, as Mar-
shall does in illarbury v Madison,3 that it purported to add to
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in the face of clear
constitutional restrictions 4 is certainly forcing the issue-and
flaunting the canon that statutes are to be construed m har-
mony with the Constitution whenever that may be done without
violence to the fair meaning of the legislature's language. 5 Even
Marshall's great admirer, Beveridge, recognized that "the great
Chief Justice" wanted an early opportunity to assert the Fed-
eralist doctrine of Judicial Supremacy Marshall by esoteric
statutory construction set up a straw man and then proceeded
to knock it over-not Congress, but the Supreme Court by
strained interpretation made Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 unconstitutional!
In McCulloch v. Maryland Marshall ignored the obvious,
discriminatory nature of the Maryland tax upon an instrumen-
tality of the national government. Invalidation of a measure
which the court pointedly treated as non-discriminating obvi-
'1 Cranch 137 (1803) The Supreme Court had recognized the
validity of Section 13 in five cases prior to Marbury v Madison,
BEVERMGE, THE LiFE OF JOm MARSHALL (1919), Vol. III, pp. 129-30.
'"In all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers
and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before men-
tioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as
Congress shall make." Art. III, Sec. 2. par. 2.
'This canon, to be sure, was not formulated as such until later,
but the principle was well known. Thus in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) Marshall says that an act
of Congress ought not to be construed to violate international law
"if any other possible construction remains "a4 Wheat., 316 (1819).
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ously carried constitutional implications enormously broader
than facts at issue required. To exempt federal instrumentali-
ties from bearing any of the cost of state government is quite
different from a holding that they may not constitutionally be
subjected to discriminatory local impositions. The huge "web of
unreality" based upon Marshall's treatment of the Maryland
legislation in the McCulloch case was brushed away only in our
own day 7
In the same manner the state tax upon importers which was
at issue in Brown v Maryland is treated as non-discriminatory
In fact it discriminated against foreign commerce and so re-
quired at most a simple application of the constitutional prohi-
bition upon state imposts or duties.8 Marshall insisted upon
considering its validity under the commerce clause as well,
where ignoring its discriminating character had broad constitu-
tional implications. It is one thing to say that states may not
put interstate commerce at a relative disadvantage with respect
to other commerce, quite another that interstate commerce may
not be made to pay its own way equally with other commerce.
It took three decisions by Marshall's successors to clakify the
problem.9
To find another base for the same result M'arshall gave
exotic meaning to national tariff legislation by construing it
not simply as a revenue or protective measure, but also as the
grant of a right or license to importers to sell in "the original
package" before which state taxing power must give way Taken
together and at full face value Mc~ulloch v. Maryland and
Brown v Maryland seriously dwarfed the constitutional scope
of state taxing power in a manner that fit perfectly the Federal-
ist theories of centralized government.
Again in Gibbons v Odgenio both state and national legis-
lation receive glosses that afford opportunity for giving ex
cathedra expression to Federalist dogma. To stimulate the devel-
opment of steamboat navigation New York had by statute
Graves v N.Y. ex rel O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
'Art. I, sec. 10.
'Woodruff v Parham, 8 Wall, 123 (1869) Welton v. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275 (1876), McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Minmg Co.,
309 U.S. 33 (1940).
1 9 Wheat., 1 (1824).
JOHN MARSHALL-STATUTES
granted exclusive steam navigation privileges upon New York
waters to Robert Fulton and his partner. In the lower court
Chancellor Kent, whose competence as a judge may not be
lightly dismissed, had found no conflict between the New York
grant and federal authority But when the validity of the state
measure was challenged m the Supreme Court Marshall without
a word of discussion treated the grant as covering interstate as
well as local commercial navigation. His successor, Chief Justice
Taney, doubtless would have done otherwise by a simple appli-
cation of the doctrine of strict construction against the grantee
and in favor of the state.
11
Raving without any question accepted the broadest possible
interpretation of the state legislation, Marshall then proceeded
to stretch the meaning of the National Coasting License Act
12
to distorted proportions so that he might find a conflict between
the two and accordingly invalidate the local legislation under the
constitutional principle of national supremacy Thus a national
coasting license is interpolated as the grant of the right of free
transit over navigable water before which state self-government
must be subsumed. But later when it suited his purposes in
another case-or was it because he could no longer carry his
associates into the realms or unreality-IV/arshall entirely ig-
nored this elongated interpretation of the same National Coast-
ing License Act and by a play on words reached an opposite re-
sult. 13 In the face of a national coasting license a state might not
interfere with national commerce by granting exclusive steam
navigation privileges, but it might do so by authorizing a dam
across navigable water to the exclusion of all commercial navi-
gation I
' See the Charles River Bridge Co. Case, 11 Peters 420 (1837)
where at page 547 Taney says "it can never be assumed that the
government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end
for which it was created." It is interesting that the real "difiger of
these "exclusive" state grants grew out of Marshall's own earlier
holdings in Fletcher v Peck and the Dartmouth College Case (see
below) which put them beyond the scope of subsequent legislative
regulafion'.
'2Actof Feb. 19, 1793, Ch. 8, I Stat.,305.
'Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 2 Peters 245
(1829). In the License Cases, 5 Howard 504, 583 (1847) Taney chides
Marshall for the word play, and construes the National Coasting
License Act as granting to license holders merely "the right to navi-
gate the public waters whenever they find them navigable "
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Finally in Fletcher v PeCk,14 and the Dartrnouth College
Caseii Marshall treated state legislation as a form of contract in
order to bring it within the constitutional prohibition upon the
impairment of contract obligations. 16 To hold that a state may
contract away its governing power is indeed a strange conclu-
sion-which can only be reached by the most tortuous means.
In Fletcher v Peck the first of the contract cases, Marshall ob-
served 'that contracts are either executed or executory "A con-
tract executed is one in which the object of the contract is per-
formed, and this, says Blackstone, differs in nothing from a
grant." Ergo a state legislative grant of land (procured in a
manner highly tainted with fraud) is a contract within the pro-
tection of the contract clause and so beyond the power of state
revocation.
But citing Blackstone's equation and playing upon his
words cannot obscure the fact that by definition no obligation
exists under either a grant or an executed contract-it having
in each case been extinguished by performance. Hence the con-
stitutional protection of contract obligations is not relevant.
Painful statutory construction had again vindicated Federalist
ideals-property interests must be safeguarded against majority
rule. And again it remained for Marshall's successors to
whittle away large parts of his opmIOns. 1Y
If one accepts as law merely what courts do, as distinct
from what they say, Marshall's holdings are at best ummpres-
sive-the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim of a disappointed office seeker against
high government officials, states may not impose discriminatory
"Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810).
"Dartmouth College v Woodword, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819)
1 Art. I, Sec. 10, par. 1. The due process clause of the 14th
Amendment was not then available.
I Charles River Bridge Co. Case, 11 Peters 420 (1837) Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) and companion cases; Stone v. Mississippi,
110 U.S. 814 (1880), Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). With
Marshall's verbalisms in Fletcher v Peck compare the refreshing
realism of Taney in the Charles River Bridge Co. Case: 'While the
rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget,
that, the community also has rights, and that the happiness and well-
being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation."
". it can never be assumed that the government intended to
diminish its power of accomplishing the -end for which it was
created" i.e. that it- has contracted away its power to govern.
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burdens upon the operations of the national government, states
may not levy imposts or duties upon imports from abroad,
states may not grant exclusive interstate navigation privileges.
In the contract cases the holdings are somewhat less than unto-
pressive--state power to protect public health, welfare, safety
and morals must give way before vested interests-even those
predicated m fraud!
If on the other hand law is what courts say as distinct from
what they do-and if one is willing to overlook a judge's "pain-
ful ingenuity" in setting up straw men to be knocked down with
vigorous, premise-obscuring rhetoric-then John Marshall did
indeed erect an imposing body of constitutional law. Albeit Ins
successors beginning with the first term of court following his
death have been diligently whittling away at it until today little
remains.
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